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Impaired action processing may be a key feature of the obsessive-compulsive checking 
phenomenon, although the mechanism underlying the impairment remains to be explored. We 
examined the ability to parse a continuous flow of movements and perceptual changes into 
meaningful segments of action—a key component of action processing—in checking proneness. 
Participants (N = 65) completed a measure of Obsessive-compulsive symptoms and, while 
viewing four videotaped movies, were requested to detect the transitions between significant 
action steps. The main result indicated that Checking—but not the other obsessive-compulsive 
dimensions— was negatively related with the size of meaningful units identified. These findings 
suggest that checking proneness may be specifically connected with difficulties processing 
actions on the basis of abstract features such as goal-related information. This could explain why 
people with checking symptoms find it more difficult to determine whether an intended goal has 
actually been achieved. 
 
 








In everyday situations, anyone may experience doubts about whether an intended action 
has actually been executed and, in response, may check for goal completion. According to some 
authors, this kind of difficulty in keeping track of one’s actions (i.e., failing to determine whether 
an intended goal has been achieved) may occur when one fails to process an ongoing action’s 
goal-related features (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). Certain contextual circumstances may trigger 
such a failure; in addition, some people may have a chronic failure in processing actions’ goal 
features (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). This characteristic has been connected with an increased 
propensity to check everyday actions, similar to that observed in Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder 
(OCD) (Belayachi & Van der Linden, 2009). Consistently, it has been suggested that people with 
OCD may lose track of the meaning of their behavior because they process actions mainly 
according “to low-level gestural units of behavior rather than to goal-related higher-level units” 
(Boyer & Liénard, 2006, p. 1). People usually parse the continuous stream of behavior into 
distinct meaningful action units (according to goal and subgoal completion). This allows one to 
understand what one is doing or what others are doing, with few resources allocated to the 
processing of each action detail. However, an inability to organize action details based on high-
level meaningful features may impair the subjective understanding of what one has just done. 
This could in turn lead some people to deploy chronic checking behaviors, even at a subclinical 
level. This paper aims to examine this assumption, by exploring whether checking proneness in 
the general population is characterized by a tendency to parse dynamic actions in terms of low-
level gestural units.  
Action parsing can be understood in the context of Event Segmentation Theory (EST; 
Kurby & Zacks, 2008; Zacks & Sargent, 2010; Zacks & Swallow, 2007; Zacks & Tversky, 
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2001). According to EST, online action processing combines bottom-up chunking of perceptual 
information into basic action segments with top-down integration of these segments into larger 
action sequences. The latter process implies the ability to organize the numerous pieces of 
information gathered during action perception on the basis of high-level meaningful features, 
such as intentions, goals and subgoals. This naturally occurring kind of perceptual processing 
allows one to organize the abundant information of an action context (movement, perceptual 
changes) into chunks of meaningful information. In laboratory settings, it can be examined by 
asking participants to watch a movie and to press a button whenever they feel that one 
meaningful event is ending (e.g., subgoal attainment) and another one beginning. Numerous 
studies show that event-boundary judgments appear reliable within participants over time 
(Newtson, 1973; Zacks, Speer, Vettel, & Jacoby, 2006).  
The subjective perception of the boundaries separating action subparts depends on a 
“perceiving by predicting mechanism,” which allows the continuous flow of information to be 
processed with few resources. On the basis of event models, which represent invariants of a 
particular situation, people may make predictions about what is about to happen. Event models 
remain stable as long as the predictions based on them are correct; however, they are refined or 
replaced when sensory data contradict those predictions. This error-based updating mechanism is 
a key determinant of how a perceived action is segmented. Indeed, it has been suggested that 
error signals surrounding event model updating may mark event boundaries (Zacks, Kurby, 
Eisenberg, & Haroutunian, 2011; Zacks & Swallow, 2007). By using the video segmentation 
paradigm, it has been demonstrated that the segmentation rate increases as the action sequence 
becomes less predictable (e.g., Newtson, 1973). In other words, a lack of action parsing 
regarding goal state knowledge, as might be the case in checking, may result in a higher 
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segmentation rate and in parsing the action into smaller parts (i.e., action parsing into low-level 
gestural units). Although event segmentation is a subjective task, numerous studies show that 
event-boundary judgments appear reliable across participants within the same sample (Newtson, 
1973; Zacks et al., 2006). Indeed, by using the video segmentation paradigm, it has been 
demonstrated that most people identify inter-event boundaries around the same time points and 
that these normative boundaries generally refer to conceptual changes (e.g., changes in an actor’s 
goal). Knowing that it is possible to calculate how close an individual’s segmentation pattern is 
to the pattern for the entire sample (i.e., segmentation agreement), we assume that a diminished 
ability to process actions’ goal features would lead to lower segmentation agreement.  
The main aim of the current study is to explore action parsing in checking proneness in 
light of the EST. Considering that a chronic focus on low-level gestural units of actions appears 
to be specific to checking (Belayachi & Van der Linden, 2009), we would expect checking 
proneness to be characterized by a tendency to identify smaller units of activity in a 
segmentation task. And knowing that low-level action parsing implies difficulties in processing 
actions’ goal-related features, we would also expect checking proneness to be connected with a 
decreased ability to identify inter-event boundaries in a normative way. We also examine the 
relationship between action parsing and memory in checking. Indeed, how actions are segmented 
may strongly influence the way people encode these actions in memory. For example, it has been 
shown that a reduced ability to identify significant event boundaries (i.e., poor segmentation 
agreement) may account for impaired performance on subsequent memory tasks (Kurby & 
Zacks, 2011; Zacks et al., 2006). Given that checking proneness in nonclinical samples has been 
related to impaired memory for actions (e.g., Zermatten, Van der Linden, Larøi, & Ceschi, 
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2006), we expect checking to be connected with poor memory performance; we also hypothesize 
that defective action parsing accounts for this relationship.  
2. Method 
2.1. Participants 
Sixty-seven undergraduates who were randomly recruited from various faculties and 
schools at the University of Liège, all aged between 18 and 29, participated in the study. They 
were not compensated for their participation. Data from two participants had to be discarded as 
they appeared to be critical outliers (cf. Section 3). The reported results are from the remaining 
65 participants (29 males and 36 females). Their mean age was 22 years (SD = 2.70 years). 
2.2. Materials and Apparatus 
2.2.1. Event Segmentation Paradigm 
Event Segmentation Task. The segmentation task1 consisted in viewing four movies, each 
of which depicted an actor performing a familiar activity (setting up a tent, planting flowers, 
washing a car, and washing clothes). The mean duration of movies was 378 s. A fifth movie 
depicting the construction of a boat from toy blocks (160 s) was used for training. During movie 
viewing, participants were asked to identify units that were natural and meaningful to them by 
pressing the space bar whenever they felt that one event was ending and another one beginning. 
They were also told that there were no right or wrong answers in this task. Each participant 
started the segmentation task with the practice movie and then segmented all four movies 
(presented in random order). We computed the unit length, which refers to the mean duration of 
subevents identified. For each movie, we first divided the length of the movie by the number of 
                                                             
1 Materials for the segmentation task and the two memory tests were kindly provided by Professor Jeffrey Zacks. 
For a detailed description of all the stimuli, see Zacks et al. (2006) (experiment 2). 
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boundaries identified. We then computed the mean unit length across the four movies. We also 
computed an index of how close a given participant’s segmentation pattern was to the pattern for 
the entire sample (segmentation agreement). Movies were divided into 1-s bins. For each movie, 
we computed the proportion of participants who identified a boundary within each bin. Then, for 
each participant, we computed the point-biserial correlation between participant’s segmentation 
data and the segmentation probabilities for the group. 
Event-related memory tasks. Participants also completed recognition and order memory 
tests concerning the videos they had segmented (see Footnote 1). The recognition memory task 
consisted in pairs of pictures: one old picture taken from the segmented movie and one new 
picture taken from a visually similar movie that the participant had not seen. In each trial, an old 
picture and a new picture were selected at random and presented side by side on the screen, with 
the location of the old picture varying randomly. For each movie, 25 old pictures and 25 new 
pictures were presented to participants, with the instruction to identify the picture that had 
appeared in the movie they saw by pressing one of two buttons. We computed the proportion of 
correct responses (accuracy) and mean response latencies (reaction time). The order memory 
task consisted in 12 pictures (per movie), printed on 15.2-cm by 10.2-cm paper with a white 
border, selected from the 25 pictures used in the recognition memory test. For each test, the 
pictures were placed in front of the participant in a pseudorandom order. Participants had to sort 
the pictures into the order in which they had occurred in the movie. We computed a completion 
time measure (time) and, on the basis of participants’ sorting of the pictures, we calculated a 
measure of order error (deviation index), by recording the position in which each person placed 
each picture, determining the absolute deviation of that position from the correct position, and 
averaging these deviations across each movie (lower error scores indicate better performance). 
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Picture Arrangement subtest. The Picture Arrangement subtest of the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale – III (Wechsler, 1997) was administered to ensure that our results did not 
depend on impaired semantic organization and temporal sequencing in checking-prone people. 
This test requires participants to sort line drawings of everyday activities into the temporal order 
in which they typically occur in that activity.  
2.2.2. Self-report measures 
The Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory – Revised (OCI-R). The OCI-R (Foa et al., 2002) is 
an 18-item questionnaire evaluating six OC dimensions (checking, washing, obsessing, ordering, 
hoarding and neutralizing). The French version of the OCI-R (Zermatten, Van der Linden, 
Jermann, & Ceschi, 2006) has good overall psychometric properties and a factor structure 
identical to that observed in Foa et al.’s (2002) original English version. In this study, 
Cronbach’s alphas suggested adequate internal consistency for most subscales (with modest 
reliability for the neutralizing scale) (see Table 1). A statistical test of homogeneity confirmed 
that the mean OCI-R checking score of participants whose checking scores fell within the top 
quartile of the distribution (N = 15; M = 5.9; SD = 1.3) was comparable to that reported by 
Huppert et al. (2007) for 186 OCD patients (M = 4.4; SD = 3.6) (p = 0.111).  
The  State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) . The STAI (Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 
1983) was administrated in order to control for the impact of anxiety on the level of action 
parsing, as high levels of anxiety can lead to local perceptual information processing (Derryberry 
& Reed, 1998). The French version of the STAI (Bruchon-Schweitzer & Paulhan, 1993)  
comprises 20 items assessing the respondents’ state of anxiety at the time of the testing session 
(i.e., STAI-S) and 20 items constituting a self-reported measure of general anxiety (i.e., STAI-T). 
Both the STAI-S and the STAI-T show strong internal consistency in this study (see Table 1).  




Informed consent was obtained from all participants following an explanation of the 
experimental procedure. In individual testing sessions, participants performed the segmentation 
task and the two memory tests and completed the Picture Arrangement subtest and 
questionnaires assessing OCD and anxiety (as well as other questionnaires not presented in this 
paper). The order of the questionnaires was counterbalanced across participants. Half of the 
participants first did the segmentation task, followed by the memory tests and then the Picture 
Arrangement subtest, after which they completed the questionnaires; whereas the other half 
completed the questionnaires first and then were given the remaining tasks.  
3. Results 
Non-normally distributed variables (the six OCI-R subscales, the unit length measure of 
the segmentation task and the accuracy variable of the recognition task) were transformed using 
the Box–Cox transformation to comply with normality and homogeneity of variance. Based on 
Cook’s distance index, preliminary analyses identified two participants as multivariate outliers 
(subjects with a Cook’s distance greater than the cutoff of 4/( number of cases − number of 
predictors − 1) are generally defined as multivariate outliers; Fox, 1991). We decided to exclude 
these data. Table 1 summarizes the mean scores and SD for the segmentation task, memory tests, 
Picture Arrangement subtest and OCI-R and anxiety measures.  
TABLE 1 AROUND HERE 
3.1. Relationships between Checking and Action Parsing Measures 
3.1.1. Unit length  
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As Table 2 shows, there was a negative correlation between checking and unit length, 
which met the Bonferroni criterion for significance (p ≤ .002).The obsessing and neutralizing 
symptoms were also negatively correlated with unit length, at an uncorrected significance.  
TABLE 2 AROUND HERE 
Considering the potentially confounding influences of the intercorrelations between OCI-
R subscales, zero-order correlations cannot determine the independent contribution of each OC 
dimension (i.e., once the effect of the other subscales has been removed). Hence, in order to 
investigate the specific relationship between the level of action parsing and the various OCI-R 
subscales, we performed a regression analysis with the transformed unit length measure as a 
dependent variable and the six transformed OCI-R subscales as independent variables, using the 
step-wise selection procedure. A Breusch-Pagan Test (χ2 =3.57, p = 0.735) suggests that the 
assumption of homoscedasticity is satisfied, and tolerance values (ranging from .54 to .83) and 
variance inflation factor (VIF) values (ranging from 1.19 to 1.87) suggest that there was no sign 
of multicollinearity (VIF values > 2.5 and tolerance < .40 are considered as problematic; Allison, 
1999). According to this regression analysis, checking is a significant independent predictor of 
low-level action parsing (t = –3.17, p = .002, β = –.38); whereas obsessing (t = –1.56, p = .124, β 
= –.19) and neutralizing (t = –0.87, p = .390, β = –.12), as well as washing (t = –0.65, p = .520, β 
= –.08), ordering (t = –0.18, p = .858, β = –.02), and hoarding (t = 1.66, p = .102, β = .19), did 
not explain a significant proportion of variance when the other subscales are statistically 
controlled for. 
We also examined the possibility that defective action parsing in checking could be 
secondary to deficits affecting organizational semantic strategies or to the fact that anxiety may 
increase attention to details. We therefore computed three separate partial correlations in order to 
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re-examine the checking–unit length relation, once the Picture Arrangement subtest, state anxiety 
and trait anxiety scores were controlled for. These analyses revealed that the relationship 
between checking and unit length remained significant and was not explained by organizational 
semantic strategies [r(62) = –.38, p = .002 ], state anxiety [r(62) = –.38, p = .002], or trait anxiety 
[r(62) = –.36, p = .003]. 
3.1.2. Segmentation agreement  
The results reported in Table 2 revealed a positive correlation between checking and 
segmentation agreement that did not meet the Bonferroni criterion for significance.  
3.2. Checking, Action Parsing and Memory Performance  
A secondary aim of this study was to examine whether defective segmentation may 
contribute to memory deficits in checking. As Table 3 reveals, memory performance was not 
related to action parsing measures or to checking proneness. 
TABLE 3 AROUND HERE 
4. Discussion 
The main aim of the present study was to explore the parsing of dynamic action in 
checking proneness, by using a task which requires participants to detect meaningful action units 
while viewing videotaped familiar actions. As expected, we observed a negative correlation 
between checking and the length of the action units identified, which is not secondary to a 
general deficit affecting semantic organizational capacities or to anxiety. Contrary to our 
hypothesis, checking was connected with good segmentation agreement, suggesting that this OC 
symptom may not be connected with problems identifying significant boundaries during action 
parsing. Nevertheless, we cannot exclude the possibility that this relation may result from the 
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tendency to parse at a low level, thus increasing the probability that one will identify inter-event 
boundaries at the same time points as the entire sample.  
Overall, these results suggest that checking-prone people may rely predominantly on low-
level movement cues to understand actions. To our knowledge, this is the first empirical support 
for the theoretical assumption that some repetitive and/or ritualized behaviors might be 
characterized by a type of action parsing that predominantly considers low-level gestural action 
units (e.g., fine motor changes), rather than abstract meaningful features (e.g., goal changes) 
(Boyer & Liénard, 2006; Zacks & Sargent, 2010). Our results are also in agreement with 
previous studies of action processing in OCD. Indeed, people with OCD were found to have an 
impaired ability to understand biological motions in terms of intentions and goals (see Jung et 
al., 2009; Kim et al., 2008). In another study, individuals with checking proneness appeared to 
construe various familiar actions mainly in terms of their procedural aspects and motor 
components, rather than according to the related goals and abstract outcomes (Belayachi & Van 
der Linden, 2009). The phenomenology of checking has frequently been connected with an 
increased tendency to generate an error signal at the early stages of action evaluation (i.e., 
overactive action monitoring; e.g., Ursu, Stenger, Shear, Jones, & Carter, 2003). This excessive 
error signaling in OCD is thought to originate in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), which was 
shown to be hyperactivated only among checking individuals (Murayama et al., 2012). 
Interestingly, EST states that the detection of inter-event boundaries may stem from error 
prediction signals generated when predictions about what is about to happen mismatch what is 
actually perceived; the ACC may be responsible for generating such signals (Kurby & Zacks, 
2008; Zacks & Sargent, 2010; Zacks, Speer, Swallow, & Maley, 2010). Knowing that a recent 
brain imaging study of event segmentation during text reading (Speer, Zacks, & Reynolds, 2007) 
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showed that the cingulate cortex, in addition to other brain areas, is particularly sensitive to the 
presence of an event boundary; thus, low-level action parsing in checking could stem from 
overactivity in the ACC. Future studies should be conducted to directly examine the association 
between the neurocognitive markers of the increased error signal and low-level action parsing in 
checking.  
Meanwhile, the origin of low-level action parsing in checking must be further explored. 
According to EST, participants may use low-level movement cues to segment dynamic action 
when they fail to perceive it as goal-directed; however, they may depend less on these cues when 
they can rely on top-down knowledge based on previous experience with analogous situations 
(Zacks, 2004). In light of this framework, one could suggest that checking-prone people may be 
unable to use such abstract representations for goal processing, which may lead them to rely 
more on low-level gestural cues in order to understand what they are doing or have just done. It 
must also be determined whether this way of functioning reflects a spontaneous focus on low-
level gestural parsing or constitutes a strategy to compensate for an impaired ability to use 
abstract representations for goal understanding. This issue could be examined by using different 
task instructions, explicitly asking participants to segment the perceived action at a coarse grain.  
A secondary aim of this study was to examine whether defective action parsing might 
account for impaired memory in checking. Unexpectedly, checking was not related to poor 
memory performance. Action parsing measures were not connected with memory performance 
either. It should be noted that a connection between segmentation measures and memory 
performance has been observed only among elderly participants (Kurby & Zacks, 2011; Zacks et 
al., 2006) and participants diagnosed with mild Alzheimer Disease (AD) (Zacks et al., 2006; 
experiment 2). More specifically, both elderly and AD participants were characterized by a 
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decreased ability to identify the significant inter-event boundaries identified by the entire sample 
(i.e., poor segmentation agreement). Among elderly and AD participants, low segmentation 
agreement was connected with impaired performance on both the temporal ordering and 
recognition memory tasks, whereas no such association was observed among young participants. 
Contrary to this finding, our checking participants were not characterized by an impaired ability 
to identify significant inter-event boundaries (i.e., good segmentation agreement), which may 
explain why we did not observe poor memory performance in checking. As well, the nature of 
memory deficits in checking is different from those in AD. Checking people may have problems 
with active recollection, which may be secondary to executive dysfunctions (Savage et al., 
2000). Indeed, people with OCD are more prone to focus on details and less able to transfer their 
attention to larger components of a scene, which may in turn lead to fragmented encoding (for a 
review, see Harkin & Kessler, 2011). In this context, the relationship between action parsing and 
memory might be better understood by using a free recall task, for example by asking 
participants to recall the main steps of the segmented activities.  
Before concluding, we will briefly address some limitations of this study. First, our 
results do not allow us to determine the nature of the relationship between action parsing and 
checking proneness; whether chronically low-level gestural parsing leads people to check their 
actions, or whether frequent checking behavior may, in the long run, provoke aberrant action 
processing remains to be explored. Second, although checking in nonclinical samples have been 
found to have clinical features and cognitive impairments similar to those identified in OCD 
patients in a wide range of studies (for a critical review, see Muller & Roberts, 2005), further 
studies should be conducted to replicate our findings in individuals with more severe checking 
symptoms (i.e., OCD patients). 




The results of this study suggest that an impaired ability to process actions in terms of 
goal-related features could, in association with other factors, lead some people to deploy 
checking behaviors. The mechanism underlying low-level action parsing in checking remains to 
be further explored. Future studies should also be conducted to examine whether checking 
people are able to parse at a coarse grain, when they are instructed to do so. Finally, future 
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Mean Scores and Standard Deviations (SD) for the Segmentation Task, Two 
Memory Tests, OCI-R and Anxiety Assessments, and Reliability for the Latter 
Two Sets of Variables 




Checking  .62 2.60 (2.21) 
Washing .75 1.81 (2.27) 
Ordering .69 4.14 (2.63) 
Hoarding .79 3.80 (2.73) 
Obsessing .73 2.58 (2.36) 
Neutralizing  .57 1.14 (1.63) 
Anxiety 
State anxiety .87 31.31 (6.83) 
Trait anxiety .89 41.94 (8.69) 
Segmentation task 
Unit length – 34.02 (31.71) 
Segmentation agreement – 0.31 (1.30) 
Recognition memory task 
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Accuracy – 0.71 (1.24) 
Reaction time  – 3672 (1113) 
Temporal order memory task 
Deviation index – 0.93 (.55) 
Time – 98.64 (34.16) 
Picture arrangement subtest – 15.65 (3.36) 
 
Note: Mean and SD for the unit length, the proportion of correct responses in 
the recognition task and the six OCI-R subscales are based on the 






















Unit length Segmentation agreement 
Checking –0.38* (.002) .34 (.006) 
Washing –0.20 (.102) –.02 (.883) 
Ordering –0.15 (.244) .08 (.555) 
Hoarding 0.10 (.408) –.04 (.780) 
Obsessing –0.29 (.020) .17 (.178) 
Neutralizing –0.25 (.045) .20 (.105) 
 
Note: Pearson correlations computed on the transformed unit length and OCI-
R subscale measures, a Bonferroni correction of (0.05/24) = 0.002 was used 












Pearson Correlations between Memory Performance and Checking and the 
Segmentation Task Measures 
 
Event segmentation OCI-R 
Unit length Segmentation agreement Checking  
Recognition memory     
Accuracy –.02 (.863) –.12 (.361) –.02 (.902) 
Reaction time  –.05 (.685) .14 (.268) .17 (.165) 
Temporal order     
Deviation index .05 (.680) –.13 (.306) –.02 (.880) 
Time –.07 (.587) .16 (.203) .01 (.913) 
 
Note: Pearson correlations computed on the transformed unit length, accuracy and 
checking measures.  
